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Employment Discrimination-REVERSEDISCRIMINATIONPRIVATELY
INSTIGATED
RACIALQUOTAS
AS ACCEPTABLE
AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION-UnitedSteelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
Between 1969 and 1974 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.
had been hiring blacks and whites one-for-one a t the hiring gate
in an effort to balance the racial makeup of the production work
force a t each of its plants with the racial makeup of the work force
in each community where a plant was located.' his practice
would eventually have balanced both production lines and seniority lists, and would also have infused some black workers into
Kaiser's craft positions under normal seniority bidding practices
over a period of years. However, the hiring practice resulted in
increasing production force minority representation by only
about 1% a year a t the Gramercy, Louisiana, plant. Roughly 15%
of that plant's work force was made up of blacks by 1974,2while
39% of the available work force in the community was black.
Racial balance in craft positions was almost nonexistent a t the
Gramercy plant by 19742
In 1974 the United Steelworkers and Kaiser agreed upon an
affirmative action plan aimed at balancing the percentage of
black craft workers more effectively with the percentage of blacks
available in the local work force.' Prior to the instigation of the
plan neither blacks nor whites had been able to train for craft
positions on the job at Kaiser. The new program afforded both
racial groups a new opportunity, in the form of on-the-job craft
training. Craft trainees were to be selected from among production workers on a seniority basis, but a t least fifty percent of the
trainees were to be black. This meant that a different seniority
standard would be allowed for blacks, permitting them to bid for
the craft program with less seniority than that required of white
workers.5
During 1974 Kaiser selected thirteen employees for the program a t its Gramercy plant.' Seven of the selected trainees were
1. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721
(1979).
2. Id. See also 99 S. Ct. at 2725. Prior to 1974 only 1.83% of the skilled workers in
craft positions a t Gramercy were black.
3. Record a t 62, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D.
La. 1976).
4. 99 S. Ct. at 2725.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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black and six were white. Brian Weber, a white production worker
who had bid on three trainee positions, was rejected for admission
even though he had more seniority than the most junior black
selected. Weber instituted a class action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of
himself and all similarly situated white workers, alleging violation of sections 703(a) and (d) of title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.'
The district court held that Title VII prohibits racial quotas
for on-the-job training programs except where such quotas are
court-ordered remedies for proven discrimination? In Weber v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical C0rp.l the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the Fifth Circuit and upheld the
affirmative action plan.1°

A.

Title VII and the "Make Whole" Doctrine

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids unequal
treatment of employees and prospective employees on the basis
of race, sex, religion, or national origin" and applies to both the
private and public sectors." The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has power to promulgate and enforce
equal employment guidelines under Title VII.13
Title VII and the EEOC guidelines both seek to place victims
of discrimination in the position of employment they would have
reached if there had been no discrimination.14 This concept,
known as the "make whole" doctrine, has been limited to those
situations in which some definite, intentional, and discriminatory
act by the employer is shown,15or to instances where in the ab7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (d) (1976).
8. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D.
La. 1976).
9. 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
10. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). Justice Powell and Justice
Stevens did not participate in the decision. Five justices voted to validate the Kaiser plan;
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate
opinion in which he concurred with the majority's opinion and result.
11. 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e-1 to 9 (1976).
12. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1974); 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e-16 (1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-4 (1976). The guidelines are located at 29 C.F.R. 00 1600.7351610.36 (1979). Part 1608, dealing with race and affirmative action, was added Jan. 16,
1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 4425 (1979).
14. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-21 (1975).
15. Id. See also Comment, How Far Can Affirmative Action Go Before it Becomes
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sence of definite discrimination, statistical disparity provides a
prima facie finding of racial animus under Title VII.16Even where
the disparity is the result of a lack of experienced craft workers,
which was the case a t Kaiser's Gramercy plant, it can form the
basis for a finding of employment discrimination.17

B. Executive Order No.

11,246

Following the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, President
Johnson issued Executive Order No. 11,246, which mandated affirmative action by any employer holding or operating under a
government contract.lRBroadened by President Nixon,Ig Executive Order No. 11,246 is now enforced by the EEOC and the Office
of Federal Contract C o m p l i a n ~ eSince
. ~ ~ the Executive Order requires government contractors to affirmatively develop plans for
achieving racial equality in employment practices, it created a
potential conflict for those employers in light of Title VII's apparent ban against race-conscious remedies other than those ordered
by a
On one hand, a contractor risked the loss of his
government contracts if he failed to comply with EEOC guidelines. On the other hand, he risked liability for reverse discrimination if compliance resulted in race-conscious action that violated the rights of white employees under Title VII.
Under pressure from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, Kaiser would have had reason to fear the loss of valuable
government contracts. Kaiser's effort to achieve racial balance by
hiring one-for-one a t the gate might well have been interpreted
Reverse Discrimination?, 26 CATH.U.L. REV.513, 541-45 (1977).
16. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336-38, 360
(1977). See also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977)
(statistical disparities subject to rebuttal by employer).
17. 41 C.F.R. 8 60-2 (1979). See also Record a t 92-93, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976); Clark, The Creation of the Newark Plan,
23 CATH.U.L. REV.443, 466-67 (1974); [I9761 1 EMPL.PRAC.
GUIDE(CCH) fl 1380.
18. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. fi 339 (1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. !i 2000e
app., a t 1232 (1976).
19. Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. fi 803 (1969), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. !i 2000e
app., a t 1236 (1976).
20. 41 C.F.R. 4 60-1.1 (1979).
21. 563 F.2d at 228-30 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). For a concise analysis of the conflict
between Title VII and Executive Order No. 11,246, see Note, Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum
& Chemical Corporation: Does Title VII Limit Executive Order 112462, 57 N.C.L. REV.
695 (1978).
The conflict between Executive Order No. 11,246 and Title VII was not immediately
apparent. Weber is the first case in which the Supreme Court has directly faced the issue
of reverse discrimination in light of voluntary private affirmative action programs.
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as an insufficient effort under the guidelines, since only limited
opportunities for blacks were available in the crafts by 1974.

C. Title VII and Majority Rights
Prior to Weber there were indications that Title VII might
prohibit some voluntary private affirmative action plans. Two
Supreme Court cases indicated that Title V11 was not necessarily
limited to the protection of minority employees. In 1971, in Griggs
v. D&e Power Co.,= the Court considered the validity of ability
tests for employees under section 703(h) of Title VII. Although
Griggs did not involve an affirmative action program, the Court
did note that "[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed" in Title VII.23
An even clearer indication came in McDonald u. Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Co.24 In McDonald two white employees of
the Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. were fired for stealing
cargo, but a black employee charged in the same incident was not
fired. The discharged white employees subsequently accused the
company of discrimination under Title VII. Again no affirmative
action program was at issue, but in holding for the white employees the Court stated:
[Tlhe EEOC, whose interpretations are entitled to great deference, has consistently interpreted Title VII to proscribe racial
discrimination in private employment against whites on the
same terms as racial discrimination against nonwhites . . . .
This conclusion is in accord with uncontradicted legislative history to the effect that Title VII was intended to "cover white
men and white women and all Americans . . ." and create an
"obligation not to discriminate against whites." We therefore
hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against
the white petitioners in this case upon the same standards as
would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson [the black
employee] white.25
22. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23. Id. at 431. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist cited this language
from Griggs in their dissenting opinions in Weber. 99 S. Ct. at 2735 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2736 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also cited language to the
same effect from Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 99 S. Ct. at 2736
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 438 U.S. at 579). This language from Furnco was
based upon the language from Griggs.
24. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
25. Id. at 279-80 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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Neither Griggs nor McDonald forced the Court to weigh affirmative action designed to correct discrimination against rights
and expectations of white workers, but the rationale of those two
cases set the stage for such a confrontation.

Weber presented the issue of whether Title VII prohibits all
voluntary, private racial quotas designed to hasten the elimination of the effects of past societal discriminati~n.~'%holding that
Title VII did not prohibit all such quotas, the Court reasoned that
the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII was to hasten minority equality in employment opportunities. The Kaiser plan, it
held, was consistent with this purpose.z7The Court further justified its holding by pointing out that the Kaiser plan "does not
unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees" by
requiring their discharge or completely barring their advancement.2RIn addition, the Court noted that since Kaiser's preferential selection of blacks was to end when the desired percentage of
black craft workers was reached, the plan was only temporary and
was not intended to "maintain racial i m b a l a n ~ e . " ~ ~
Concurring, Justice Blackmun viewed the Kaiser plan with
approval because "the craft training program [was] new and
[did] not involve an abrogation of pre-existing seniority
rights."30 In his view, the Kaiser plan was a justifiable response
to statistical disparities that arguably constituted a Title VII
~ i o l a t i o n .Furthermore,
~'
Justice Blackmun saw a need to resolve
the conflict created by Title VII and the EEOC guidelines. While
he would have preferred a different approach-one of allowing
restrictive, private, voluntary affirmative action programs only
when an arguable violation of law was present-Justice Blackmun was still willing to join the majority to resolve the conflict.3z
Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger in a
dissent that focused upon congressional intent.33Unable to agree
that Congress endorsed in Title VII any form of race-conscious
action except as a remedy for a specific finding of discrimination,
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

99 S. Ct. at 2724-25.
at 2730.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
2731-32 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
2734-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist reasoned from Griggs and McDonald that Title
VII did not permit employers to voluntarily prefer racial minorities.34In his view the only intent of Title VII was to present "a
flat prohibition on discrimination 'against any individual . . .
because of such individual's race . . . . 9935
3

The Court did not "define in detail the line of demarcation
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action
plans," but merely held that the Kaiser "affirmative action plan
falls on the permissible side of the line."3Wevertheless, an analysis of the Court's justifications for its holding sheds some light on
where that line might ultimately be drawn.

A. Justifications
The Weber majority relied on the fact that the goal of the
Kaiser plan was to achieve racial balance with haste.37It viewed
this goal as consistent with congressional intent in Title VII.38
Thus a voluntarily adopted plan instigated to "hasten the elimination"39of the effects of past societal discrimination would likely
comport with the Court's view of permissible affirmative action.
In order to achieve racial balance rapidly, the Kaiser plan
created a new, dual seniority system, which arguably disrupted
the seniority expectations of white employees and diluted the
plant-wide seniority to which white workers had looked for upward mobility. Since Title VII might prohibit the disruption of
such expectations because of race, and since the courts have
tended to protect Title VII rights against disruption by the collective bargaining process,40the Court in Weber attempted to further justify its potentially harsh result by concluding that the
34. Id. a t 2736-37, 2748 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. Id. a t 2748-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 9 2000e-2(a) (1976)).
36. Id. a t 2730.
37. Id. a t 2728.
38. The opinion cited comments by Senators Humphrey, Carlson, Javits, Miller,
Dirksen, Allott, Kennedy, and Clark to illustrate its view of congressional intent in Title
VII. Id. a t 2727-29 (citing 110 CONG.REc.6547 passim (1964)). The majority also examined
the language of Title VII and the accompanying House report. Id. a t 2728 (citing H.R.
REP.NO. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963)).
39. Id. a t 2728.
40. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,51(1974). See also TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977).
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plan was merely temporary." This conclusion deserves a closer
look.
The union claimed that the fifty percent quota, which necessitated a dual seniority system, would end when racial balance
was achieved." The Court appears to have accepted this claim
without careful consideration. It is likely that some quota for
black craft trainees will remain long after racial balance is initially reached. The percentage of blacks entering the training
program will be higher in relation to the in-plant black work force
than the percentage of white trainees in relation the the in-plant
white work force. This will perpetuate a black seniority deficiency
in the non-craft, in-plant work force." As a result, black workers
in a collapsed single seniority system would be unable to compete
effectively with whites and the proportion of black craft trainees
would soon fall below acceptable EEOC guildeline levels. It
41. Both the majority and concurring opinions took comfort in the temporariness of
the plan.
Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial
balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. Preferential selection of craft trainees a t the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage
of black skilled craft workers in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.
99 S. Ct. a t 2730. "[TJhe program . . . ends when the racial composition of Kaiser's craft
work force matches the racial composition of the local population. It thus operates as a
temporary tool for remedying past discrimination without attempting to 'maintain' a
previously achieved balance." Id. a t 2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
42. In its brief the union stated:
We italicize the word "temporary" to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to the nature of the program a t issue. Respondent's [Weber's] brief
states that the 1974 agreement mandates quota selection even after the existing
imbalance has been eliminated. But the 1974 agreement expressly provides that
this procedure shall apply only "until the goal is reached." Thus the program
is addressed to eliminating an existing racial imbalance, not to establishing
racial balance as a permanent criterion. What is a t stake here is the legality of
this program and not the legality of a program which establishes a racial quota
as a permanent selection criterion.
Reply Brief for United Steelworkers of America a t 5, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S.
Ct. 2721 (1979) (footnotes and citations omitted). The union failed to explain how Kaiser
would be able to continue compliance with EEOC guidelines and regulations without
maintaining some quotas indefinitely. The assumption was that a t some time in the future
the problem would simply be corrected by the plan.
43. To illustrate, suppose Kaiser had 100 employees, 10 of whom were black. If it
separated its employees into two seniority lists, with 90 whites in one list and 10 blacks
in the other, and if it drew equally from each list, the shorter list would be reduced by
one-tenth when the first worker was taken from it, while the longer list would be reduced
by one-ninetieth. After ten years, taking one man from each list per year, the black list
would be completely turned over, and the black with the most seniority on the list could
have no more than ten years of seniority. The white list, however, would have lost only
ten workers out of ninety, and many of the remaining white workers could easily have
accumulated much more than ten years of seniority.
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would then be necessary to reinstitute a quota system. Kaiser
itself recognized this possibility:
If and when the goal is reached, a percentage quota reflecting
the percentage of minority workers in the overall labor force will
be established for the training programs. This quota is expected
to be used indefinitely to assure perpetual "minority representation in the plant that is equal to that representation in the
community work force p ~ p u l a t i o n . " ~ ~

There is a measure of irony in the Court's validation of the
Kaiser plan. Evidence a t trial established that employees hired
at the 1974 gate would amass enough seniority under the old
seniority system in' fifteen to twenty years to compete for craft
training." Assuming the competitive position of blacks hired in
1969 was similar, those blacks might be able to bid on craft training slots effectively by 1984. Thus the Kaiser plan begins to place
blacks in the crafts perhaps no more than ten years earlier than
the old system, but by Kaiser's own admission, it established a
race-conscious system that will last a t least thirty years, and
could last much longer. In the words of Mr. Justice Rehnquist's
dissent, in order to achieve haste in eliminating the last vestiges
of past societal discrimination, the Court has "introduce[d] into
Title VII a tolerance for the very evil that the law was intended
to e r a d i ~ a t e . " ~ ~

B. The Future of Voluntary Affirmative Plans
The impact of Title VII on future affirmative action plans
concerns both employers and employees. Weber offered beleaguered employers some relief from the apparent conflict between
Title VII and Executive Order No. 11,246 by allowing employers
to use statistical disparity and racial imbalance as a justification
for creating racial quotas in training programs.47Weber left employers, however, with a significant measure of uncertainty, and
employers planning new affirmative action programs must still be
cognizant of the rights of white workers.
At least three questions remain after Weber: (1)Would the
44. Brief for Respondents at 4, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S . Ct. 2721 (1979)
(quoting Record at 66 (testimony of Dennis E. English, Industrial Relations Superintendent at the Gramercy plant, Apr. 1, 1975)).
45. Record at 92-93.
46. 99 S. Ct. at 2753 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 2729 (Congress intended to allow affirmative action plans designed to
correct racially imbalanced work forces).
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Court construe Title VII to prohibit a voluntary plan that required the discharge or absolutely barred the advancement of
white employees? (2) Would a plan that provided a manifestly
permanent quota be unacceptable under Title VII? (3) Would a
plan that altered an established seniority system be prohibited?
Since the Kaiser plan actually offered both black and white
workers a new chance for a d v a n ~ e m e n ta, ~plan
~ that required the
discharge or barred the advancement of white employees would
probably be viewed differently by the C o ~ r t . 'Given
~
the plain
language of Title VIISOand the Court's language in McDonald and
Grigg~,~'
it is likely that the Court would find such a plan unacceptable.
What the Court would do with a permanent quota is less
clear. The argument that the Kaiser plan would not be permanenv2 seemed to affect the Court's decision in Weber. " Since the
Court was apparently not influenced by the longevity of the plan
and its effect upon a full generation of white workers, it is difficult
to predict just how the Court would view a manifestly permanent
quota system.
Given the implicit policy in Title VII of achieving racial bala n ~ e however,
,~~
the Court should find a manifestly permanent
quota system unacceptable. Nothing in Title VII requires or even
implicitly condones the permanent unequal treatment of blacks
and whites.
The third question, dealing with change in seniority systems,
presents a difficult problem. Seniority patterns were unquestionably changed at Gramercy, but the change was in a completely
new training program.55The Court apparently felt that old expec48. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
49. See 99 S. Ct. a t 2730.
50. The statute declares:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other
training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate
against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide . . .
training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976).
51. 427 U.S. at 279-80; 401 U.S. a t 431.
52. See notes 41-42 supra.
53. The only place where the temporariness argument was pointedly argued was in
the union's reply brief. That both the majority and concurring opinions mention the issue
as partial justification for the holding indicates that the union's argument was somewhat
persuasive. See 99 S. Ct. a t 2730; id. a t 2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
54. See id. a t 2728-29.
55. Id. a t 2734 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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tations had no force in a new program. A plan that deprived white
workers of seniority expectations in an established program would
likely violate Title VII.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Weber majority saw the Kaiser plan as a reasonable
response to the problem of employment discrimination, consistent with Congress' purpose in enacting Title VII. The goal of
hastening minority participation in employment areas previously
closed to minorities and the supposedly temporary nature of the
plan were seen by the Court as justifications for its holding.
Weber only gives general guidelines as to which voluntary
affirmative action plans might be permissible, and many questions remain unanswered. However, it seems that Title VII would
prohibit race-conscious quotas in private, voluntary affirmative
action plans if the imposition of quotas would unduly trammel
established majority rights. New plans must therefore continue
to tread lightly where the employment expectations of white
workers are involved.
Stephen A. Van Dyke

